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INTRODUCTION
Spoofing attacks are a serious problem for civil
GNSS applications with safety content, such as airplane
landing or maritime navigation in harbors. Also many
strategically important infrastructures, such as electric
power grids or mobile communications networks, are
becoming increasingly dependent on GNSS services.
Military GNSS users solve that problem by signal
encryption at chip level. This reduces the threat to only
allow for meaconing, i.e. retransmitting the GNSS sig-
nals from a certain location, since the exact waveform
is unpredictable. Civil users cannot rely on encryption
at the moment and most likely in the near future. They
must be protected by additional techniques, which are
able to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks.
A number of receiver-autonomous solutions for the
spoofing problem have been proposed in the last decade.
For single antenna receivers the detection of spoof-
ing attacks can rely on the observation of the time
evolution of different signal parameters such as power
and Doppler frequency shift, the PRN code delay and
its rates, the correlation function shape as well as the
cross-correlation of the signal components at different
carrier frequencies. However, the most advanced pro-
tection against the sophisticated spoofing attacks can be
provided by utilizing the spatial domain for signal pro-
cessing available by using antenna arrays ([1], [2], [3],
[4], [5]). A GNSS receiver with an antenna array is able
to estimate the directions of arrival of the impinging
waveforms and so to discriminate between the authentic
and counterfeit signals. Moreover the malicious signals
can be mitigated by generating a spatial zero into the
array antenna reception pattern in the direction of the
spoofing source(s).
The use of the array-aided joint estimation of the
array attitude and spoofing detection was investigated
by the authors in [1], [3], [5]. A post-correlation esti-
mation of the signal direction of arrival (DOA) was
utilized as the first step of the corresponding signal
processing chain. This approach however still suffers
from the effects of short-term distortions in the receiver
tracking loops and the resulting unavailability of the
DOA estimations during the spoofing attack. Two ap-
proaches have been identified to overcome this effect.
On the one hand, a more accurate direction of arrival
detection and antenna calibration can be used. On the
other hand, the attitude estimation can be made more
robust by skipping the DOA estimation step and using
instead directly the post-correlation array outputs in the
underlining measurement model, similar to method 2 in
[6]. The latter possibility will be exploited throughout
the current paper. One of the main challenges here is
to design robust and computationally effective attitude
estimation when the post-correlation array outputs con-
sist of the superposition of the authentic and counterfeit
signals. This problem, for example, is not adequately
handled in [6] and [7].
In the aforementioned approaches, the estimation of
the actual direction of arrival in terms of (antenna local)
azimuth and elevation was done explicitly before the
attitude was estimated. The approach presented in the
paper will avoid this (computationally expensive) step,
by introducing an adequate measurement model. This
model connects the measured relative phases between
the antennas elements (spatial signature) to the ones ex-
pected from the almanac. This interconnection involves
the receiver attitude, which is the state to be estimated.
In a second step, the model fit (i.e. residuals of
least square fit) is used to detect anomalies. Further
processing is done by comparing the spatial signature
for different satellites. Contrary to using the cyclic
nature of PRN codes to detect the direction in the
pre-correlation domain as described in [2], the spatial
signature in the post-correlation domain is used. If one
dominant direction is present, the likelihood of spoofing
or meaconing is considered high. If detected, a second
processing stage is triggered, capable of spatially filter-
ing out the spoofers signature (post-correlation nulling).
Finally a second run of the aforementioned procedure is
done to estimate the antennas attitude using a spatially
filtered signal. Theoretical results as well as hardware
simulations ([8]) show, that if a GPS/CA or Galileo
receiver already tracks a certain PRN, the likelihood
of success is very low for an unsynchronized spoofer.
In this context (un)synchronized is related to the PRNs
current frequency shift (caused by the Doppler Effect),
as well as code delay. The code delay error should
not be larger than one chip in general. The tolerable
frequency mismatch however, highly depends on the
receivers implementation (i.e. FLL and PLL parameters
and stages), but should not be bigger than a few mul-
tiples of 50 Hz. A synchronized spoofer or meaconing
signal which is turned on when the receiver already
tracks the corresponding PRN will be considered in the
context of the paper. The described methods will be
evaluated using software simulations. Scenarios without
spoofing or meaconing are used to demonstrate the
attitude estimation. Scenarios with repeaters will be
used to demonstrate the two-stage approach with spatial
filtering.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
First a physical model of the array based receiver is de-
scribed to justify the assumptions made. A signal model
using the adopted assumptions is presented, before an
algorithm for estimating the antenna arrays attitude
and detecting a (spatially spread) spoofer/meaconer is
developed. Finally the performance is evaluated using
simulated data.
NOTATION
The following notation is used throughout the paper:
• x: Bold face lower letters denote column vectors
• X: Bold face capital letters denote matrices
• X : Calligraphic letters denote sets
• |X |: The number of elements contained in a set
• (·)T , (·)H : The transpose and conjugate transpose
of a vector or matrix
• (·)∗: The complex conjugate
• : The Hadamard product (elementwise product)
• ∗: The convolution operation
PHYSICAL MODEL
The purpose of this chapter is to state a physical
model of the receiver which allows justifying the as-
sumptions made throughout the paper. The complex
baseband representation of the received signal of the ar-
ray GNSS receiver (see Fig. 1) with M antenna elements
for the nominal interference-free signal conditions with
signals received from a GNSS constellation can be
modeled with the following baseband model (see for
comparison [7] and [9]):
x(t) =
∑
l∈L
sl(t) + n(t) (1)
L denotes the set of nominal PRN sequences re-
ceived. The overall number of GNSS satellites tracked
Fig. 1: Receiver setup including calibration to measure
and compensate for front-end and cable effects (i.e.
delays of the channels).
Fig. 2: Antenna coordinate frame with 4 elements,
baselines and one incoming signal from direction el
represented as vector with length 1.
by a receiver is N = |L|. x(t) ∈ CM represent the
arrays baseband measurements over time. n(t) denotes
the baseband representation of the receiver noise. It
is assumed to be band-limited, circularly-symmetric,
spatially and temporally white Gaussian noise (WGN)
with power spectral density N0 over a bandwidth B.
sl(t) ∈ C denotes a scalar signal received at the
antennas reference point (origin of the coordinate frame
in which the base vectors of the elements bm are
measured). The term sl(t) ∈ CM is the signal received
from the l-th satellite which can be written as:
sl(t) =a(el) h(el, t)∗√
P ldl(t− τl)cl(t− τl)ej(2pifD,lt+θl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sl(t)
(2)
el = [ cos(ϕl) cos(θl), sin(ϕl) cos(θl), sin(θl)]
T ∈
R3 is a unit vector pointing in the direction given by the
elevation θl and azimuth ϕl. a(Θl, ϕl) = a(el) ∈ CM
is the array steering vector that accounts for the geomet-
rical distribution of the antenna elements in the array
grid and is defined as (see [10], Eq. (2.28)):
a(el) =

ejke
T
l b1
ejke
T
l b2
. . .
ejke
T
l bM
 (3)
k = 2piλ is the wavenumber corresponding to the
frequency f = cλ and bm is the vector from the origin of
coordinates to the m-th array element (see Fig. 2). The
vector h(el, t) ∈ CM in Eq. (3) describes the impulse
responses of the individual array elements with the RF
front-ends attached to them:
h(el, t) =

hant,1(el, t) ∗ hFE,1(t)
hant,2(el, t) ∗ hFE,2(t)
. . .
hant,M (el, t) ∗ hFE,M (t)
 (4)
hant,m(el, t) is the impulse response of the m-th array
element in the direction given by el, and hFE,m(t)
is the impulse response of the RF front-end-channel
connected to the m-th array element. Please note that
the resulting term of the elementwise product a(el)
h(el, t) describes the complex array response in the
direction of the l-th satellite.
For simplicity in the framework of this study it
is assumed that only the line-of-sight component of
the satellite signal can be observed and that multipath
effects can be neglected. In view of this the contribution
due to the l-th satellite in Eq. (2) is defined by the
following set of parameters:
• Pl is nominal received power corresponding to
the isotropic antenna with unity antenna gain.
• cl(t − τl) is the pseudorandom noise (PRN)
spreading sequence used by the satellite.
• dl(t− τl) is the data modulation.
• τl is the propagation delay of the satellite signal,
assuming that group and phase delay are equal,
i.e. neglecting the dispersive properties of the
ionospheric delay.
• fD,l is the Doppler frequency offset resulted from
the satellite and user motion, fD,l = − r˙λ , where r˙
denotes the rate of the LOS range (see e.g. [11],
Eq. (1.4)).
• ϕl is the nominal received phase of the carrier,
this terms also accounts for the carrier phase shift
resulted from the propagation delay.
In case of a spatially distributed spoofing attack, the
spoofer is allowed to use up to NTx transmit antennas.
The i-th spoofer station transmits a certain PRN se-
quences that belongs to the set Ki. The overall set of
spoofing counterfeit signals is given by K = ∪NTxi=1Ki.
Every fake PRN sequence is generated by at most one
spoofing/meaconing station, i.e. Ki ∩ Kj = ∅ ∀i 6= j.
Every station is characterized by its direction w.r.t.
the victim. These directions are given by the corre-
sponding azimuth and elevation {(Θsi , ϕsi )}NTxi=1. This
also implies, that the spatial signature vector a(esi ) is
common for all PRNs in ki ∈ Ki, i.e. for all PRNs
transmitted by station i.
A short remark about notation seems necessary:
The scheme uses index sets, which adds one layer
of indirection for identifying the PRN numbers. This
seems necessary to describe scenarios as precise as
possible, since the PRN sequences received in real
scenarios are not ordered. The split of PRN sequences
generated from certain spoofer location may also be
almost arbitrary with just the one restriction (every
PRN sequence is transmitted from at most one location)
mentioned before.
A superposition of all nominal and counterfeit signals
is given by x(t) in complex baseband representation
before the correlation:
x(t) =
∑
l∈L
sl(t) + n(t)+
NTx∑
i=1
a(esi )
[ ∑
k∈Ki
ssk(t) + ηi(t)
]
(5)
ηi(t) is additive noise received from the i-th spoofing
source and ssk(t) is the counterfeit PRN k transmitted
from station i, for which k ∩ Ki 6= ∅. In order to
obtain a clear simple signal model, the array ele-
ments are assumed to be isotropic at first and the
effect of the RF front ends negligible, i.e. h(el, t) =
(δ(t), δ(t), ..., δ(t))T , where δ(t) denotes the Dirac
delta distribution. This is to a great extend justified
by utilizing an online calibration (see Fig. 1). Also,
by neglecting the effect of data modulation, the signal
model of Eq. (2) can be stated as:
x(t) =
∑
l∈L
a(el)
√
Plcl(t− τl)ej(2pifD,lt+ϕl) + n(t)+
NTx∑
i=1
a(esi )
[∑
k∈K
√
P sk c
s
k(t− τj)ej(2pif
s
D,kt+ϕ
s
k) + ηi(t)
]
(6)
The signal x(t) is used for correlation with a com-
mon replica for all array elements in a given satellite
channel of the receiver. After correlating with the lth
PRN code, the output yl(t) reads:
yl(t) =
1√
N0T
T∫
0
x(t)∗cl(t− τˆl)ej(2pifˆD,lt+ϕˆl)dt =
a(el)
√
PlT
N0
R(τ,l)sinc(fD,lτl)e
jϕl+
a(esj)
√
P sl T
N0
R(sτ,k)sinc(fsD,kτ
s
k)e
jsϕk+
NTx∑
i=1
a(esi )ξi + νl (7)
The assumption that every PRN is only transmitted
once was used by computing the second summand.
The index j which was assigned to the spoofers di-
rection is chosen such that l ∈ Kj . Since the sets are
disjoint, this is only possible for at most one set Kj .
ξi models the post correlation noise term due to the
transmission of noise by every source in addition the
corresponding PRN sequence assigned to it. νl models
the uncorrelated part received by every antenna. T is the
correlators integration time. τ,l, fD,l and ϕ,l are the
tracking errors for the code delay, Doppler frequency
and carrier phase. Correspondingly, sτ,l, 
s
fD,l
and sϕ,l
are the values for the spoofers signal w.r.t. currently
used replica, which was parametrized with τˆl, fˆD,l and
ϕˆl.
ASSUMPTIONS AND ESTIMATION PROBLEM
A shortcut notation for complex factors of the an-
tenna steering vectors is introduced:
gl =
√
PlT
N0
R(τ,l)sinc(fD,lτl)e
jϕl
gsl =
√
P sl T
N0
R(sτ,k)sinc(fsD,kτ
s
k)e
jsϕk (8)
After developing a physical model for the
spoofer/repeater in the previous section, some
assumptions for simplification are introduced:
1) The noise transmitted by the spoofing antennas
is assumed to be zero.
2) The receivers loops are assumed to be in a
steady state, i.e. the magnitude and phase of both
nominal and spoofing signal are considered to be
constant.
3) Tracking of the nominal signal is perfect and
prompt corrector output is used. Previous esti-
mates are used to normalize the nominal output,
i.e. gl = 1.
The nominal PRNs are assumed to be ordered, i.e.
L = {1, .., N}.
Nominal Case
For the nominal case, the correlator output reads:
yl(t) = a(el) + νl (9)
To describe the antennas attitude w.r.t. to the local
ENU-Frame in terms of roll, pitch and yaw, a rotation
matrix R ∈ SO(3) is introduced. Further details can
be found in [4]. The corresponding directional cosine
vectors in both frames are connected via eloc = Reenu.
The subscript ”loc” and ”enu” will be dropped in the
remainder of the paper (i.e. eenu for satellite l is denoted
by el).
Assuming identical independently distributed (iid)
Gaussian noise in each tracking channel, the joint prob-
ability density function (pdf) of the correlator output
given the attitude is the product of the single pdfs:
p(ν1..νN ) =
N∏
l=1
p(νl)
p(νl) ∼ exp((yl − a(el))HC−1N (yl − a(el))) (10)
CN is denoting the covariance of the noise, which is
given by σ2NI . Using a maximum likelihood approach
evaluating the aforementioned pdf of the tracking chan-
nels, a minimization of the sum of exponents (see Eq.
(10)) is done, yielding the following optimization for
R ((·)∗ denotes the estimate of the optimal value):
R∗ = arg min
R∈SO(3)
N∑
l=1
‖yl − al(R)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f(R;Y ,B,E)
(11)
This problem is equivalent to the following:
R∗ = arg max
R∈SO(3)
N∑
l=1
Re{yHl al(R)} (12)
The structure of this optimization problem does not
allow for a straightforward solution for the following
reasons:
1) No closed form solution is available.
2) The cost function f(·) is none-convex in R,
meaning several maxima exist.
3) The restriction to orthogonal matrices forces
special manifold optimization techniques.
To deal with these effects, an iterative approach with
a starting point close to the maximum is implemented.
Details on how to deal with the manifold structure can
be found in [12] and especially for the orthogonal man-
ifold in [13]. A steepest ascend line search algorithm on
that manifold is used. The involved Euclidean gradient
needed reads:
∇Rf(R;B,E,Y ) =
M∑
m=1
N∑
l=1
y∗m,lj2pie
j2pibTmRelbme
T
l
(13)
The following parametrization for the cost function
is used:
B = [b1, .., bM ]
E = [e1, .., eN ]
Y = [y1, ..,yN ] (14)
Without considering the restriction of the feasible set
SO(3), the convergence properties of the algorithm are
very poor, i.e. a starting point R0 has to be chosen,
which is very near the optimal value. However, this
can be dropped, if a successive estimation over time
(”tracking”) is considered. The estimate of the last
epoch is used to initialize the estimation of the current
epoch. The assumption here is, that the starting for the
first iterate is not ”to far” away from the optimal point.
The maximum distance mainly depends on the current
constellation and the geometry (i.e. baseline vectors) of
the antenna elements.
Spoofing Detection
If the residual of the attitude estimation problem is
larger than a certain threshold , the presence of a
spoofer is detected. If detected, the model stated in in
Eq. (9) is rejected. The following is assumed instead:
yl(t) = a(el) + a(ei)g
s
l + νl (15)
The steering vector a(ei) is assumed to be observed
at the correlator output of more than one satellite
channel of the receiver. If it can be found, a projection
into this orthogonal subspace is performed, redoing
the process of finding the direction. This naturally
corresponds to a mitigation of the spoofer.
The direction finding process is repeated taking the
projection into account. This is repeated at most L− 1
times, yielding a succesive cancellation of the spoofers
DoA.
Mitigation
If a spoofer was detected, the fundamental assump-
tion is the presence of the corresponding steering vector
in several satellite channels of the multi-antenna corre-
lator outputs. The correlation matrix of a corresponding
tracking channel l reads:
Cyl ≈ alaHl + |gsl |2asiaH,si + 2Re{gsl asiaHl } (16)
This is an approximation since the noise is consid-
ered small compared to the signal. The span of the
correlation matrices is caused by the steering vector
of the nominal signal and the steering vector of the
spoofers direction i, from which the ”fake” PRN l
is transmitted. Summing up the available correlation
matrices will (according) to the spoofers parameters
emphasize this steering vector in the final span of Cyl .
Cy =
1
N
N∑
l=1
Cyl (17)
Under the assumption that the spoofing steering
vector spans the dominant space of the correlation, it’s
estimate is given by:
aˆi(e
s) = arg max
a
aHCya s.t. ‖a‖ = 1 (18)
The solution is given by choosing the eigenvector
corresponding to the strongest eigenvalue of Cy.
To mitigate the effect of the spoofer, the output of the
correlation process is projected (i.e. spatially filtered)
in the orthogonal subspace spanned by the estimated
spoofing direction, which is given by:
P⊥(aˆi(es)) = I − 1‖aˆi(es)‖2 aˆi(e
s)aˆi(e
s)H (19)
When considering eigenvectors directly, the normal-
ization can be dropped by definition, yielding:
P⊥(aˆi(es)) = I − aˆi(es)aˆi(es)H (20)
The attitude estimation process is repeated by solving
the optimization problem stated in Eq. (12) in the
projected subspace:
R∗ = arg max
R∈SO(3)
N∑
l=1
‖yHl P⊥al(R)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f(R;P ,Y ,B,E)
(21)
Final Algorithm
The final algorithm is depicted in Fig. 3:
Fig. 3: Simultaneous attitude estimation and spoofing
detection algorithm. f(R) = f(R;P ,Y ,B,E) is
used as a short cut in the block diagram.
The estimation process is performed initially under
the assumption, that no spoofer is present. If a spoofer
is detected by inspecting the cost function using the
optimal estimate for the attitude, a dominant direction
using all estimates for the correlations is searched for
constructing the projector. This process is repeated by
continuously searching for dominant subspaces if the
residual is to large.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Software simulations have been performed to test the
performance of the proposed algorithm before process-
ing real data. Several scenarios have been set up using
different parameters.
Scenario 1
The first scenario consists of a random constellation
using 5 nominal signals with randomly chosen elevation
and azimuth angles. The array consists of a 2 × 2
uniform rectangular array (URA) with baseline vectors
spaced by λ2 . The center of the antenna coordinate
frame is chosen as the center of point symmetry of this
configuration, yielding the following baseline vectors:
B = [b1, b2, b3, b4] =
λ
4
1 1 −1 −11 −1 1 −1
0 0 0 0
 (22)
The starting point R0 to initialize the line search
algorithm was chosen to have a difference in pitch, roll
and yaw of each 40 degree from the true attitude. This
value was used for all simulations performed.
Fig. 4 shows the outcome of the attitude estimation
using algorithm depicted in Fig. 3. A noise variance of
0.01 was chosen. This corresponds to a signal to noise
ratio in the post-correlation domain of about 40dB. 100
successive simulation runs have been performed.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Epochs
0
20
40
60
80
Er
ro
r
in
de
gr
ee
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
Fig. 4: Quality of estimated attitude compared to
ground truth used for simulation.
For simulation run 50 to 70 a spoofer coming in from
a randomly chosen direction was added on all 5 signals,
with an amplitude of 2 for all signals. Fig. 5 shows the
corresponding residual of the cost function with and
without performing the mitigation strategy described in
the previous sections.
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Fig. 5: Residual of optimization cost function.
Since the estimation of the underlying rotation alone
is not enough to explain the structure of the incoming
signal, for periods 50 to 70 the presence of a spoofer
is declared (indicated by the blue background).
To investigate the effect of the residual, several
parameter variations of the spoofer to nominal signal
ratio have been performed. The results are presented in
the next chapter.
Residual of Cost function in Presence of Spoofer
Several simulation runs have been performed to de-
termine the effect of spoofer with different spoofer to
signal ratio varying from -25 to 15 dB. The result is
depicted in Fig. 6:
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Fig. 6: Residual of optimization cost function
depending on spoofers nominal to signal ratio.
Every simulation run was repeated 30 times. The
mean value of all runs was chosen as representative
value. 10 incoming signals have been used to perform
the simulations. The nominal signal to noise ratio was
again 40 dB.
Fig. 7 shows the difference of the residual in the cost
function for mitigation.
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Fig. 7: Residual of optimization cost function
dependent on the projected and mitigated case.
Fig. 8 again shows the effect of performing one
projection. This time 5 spoofing PRNs are chosen from
one direction and the other 5 from an other direction.
The quality of the attitude estimation can be mea-
sured in terms of the matrix norm ‖R − R∗‖. This
difference is compared for the unprojected and mit-
igated case in Fig. 9. It can clearly be seen that a
bias is introduced for weak spoofing powers. This is
most likely be caused by an error in the estimate of
the spoofers direction, i.e. not all contributions of the
spoofer are spatially filtered. The stronger the spoofers
power is, the better is the estimate. However, a constant
bias is introduced.
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Fig. 8: Residual of optimization cost function.
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Fig. 9: Residual of optimization cost function.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
An approach for solving the joint problem of esti-
mating an antenna arrays attitude and detecting spoof-
ing/meaconing attacks by using the correlator outputs
of an GNSS array receiver has been proposed. A
physical model of the array receiver has been introduced
and used further to formulate the estimation problem
and describe the associated assumptions. It has been
shown that the resulting optimization problem has no
closed-form solution and therefore an iterative algo-
rithm has been proposed (see Fig. 3). The gradients of
the optimization cost function required in the iterative
algorithm has been derived. In order to evaluate the
performance of the proposed solution, numerical simu-
lations, where a 2-by-2 uniform rectangular array with
half-wavelength spacing of the antenna elements was
used, have been performed. The results of the numerical
simulations indicate the ability to reliably detect the
simulated spoofing attack and mitigate the interference.
In these simulations, an accurate estimation of the array
attitude has been delivered under the interference-free
conditions while systematic estimation errors on the
level of up to 40 degrees (e.g. for yaw angle, see Fig.
4) have been observed.
Future work will focus on the improving of the
algorithm performance including the following topics:
• performing more extensive hardware simulations
in order to cover a larger scope of possible
spoofing/meaconing scenarios
• extension of the proposed approach to the case
of sequential estimation
• assessment of the statistical properties of the
proposed detection scheme
• evaluating the proposed approach on raw samples
collected in field experiments
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